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I. INTRODUCTION

The reliance interest has fascinated me for some time.' As a measure
of damages for breach of contract,2 it seems theoretically unjustified and
flawed in its implementation. In theory, it requires compensation for
lost opportunities? In practice, such compensation is rarely provided'* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. J.D. 1983, B.G.S.
1975, University of Michigan; M.A. 1980, University of Illinois.
1. Michael B. Kelly, The Phanton Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 1992
WIS. L. REv. 1755.
2. My focus has been on contracts, full-fledged bargains, rather than promissory
estoppel or other instances where the reliance interest might be applied. Much of my
criticism of the reliance interest has been limited to this context. This Article will
expand somewhat the scope of my criticism.
3. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: 1, 46 YALE LJ. 52, 55, 60-61 (1936); Mark Pettit, Jr., PrivateAdvantage and
Public Power: Reexamining the Expectation and Reliance Interests in Contract
Damages, 38 HASTINGS L.J 417,420-21 (1987).

unless one counts the expectation interest as a proxy for opportunities
lost in reliance on a promise.5 In theory, it justifies recoveries that may
exceed expectation.6 Yet, even its progenitors refused to endorse that
implication.7 Why, then, does the reliance interest have continuing
appeal?
One explanation has emerged from discussions with academics: the
reliance interest seems apt to some because it resembles tort remedies.
Expectation is available only in contract, not in tort." Tort is perceived
as the realm of reliance recoveries. That inconsistency may make people
uncomfortable. Scholars who see contract as simply a subset of tort
naturally prefer that tort remedies apply in each context.' Similarly,
scholars seeking unified principles underlying remedies generally might
be drawn to prefer the reliance interest in contract. 0 The perception that
reliance governs in tort appears to contribute to the continuing

popularity of the reliance interest in the face of scholarly challenges."
This Article challenges the assumption that the reliance interest is a
tort remedy. To the extent that tort remedies can be broken down into
expectation and reliance at all, tort remedies usually resemble
expectation more closely than they resemble reliance. The project shall
proceed in three stages. It will focus first on misrepresentation, the one
tort where the reliance interest makes theoretical sense. Despite the
justification for employing the reliance interest, it appears that tort law
4. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.1, at 759 (3d ed. 1999).
5. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 3, at 60-62.
6. Pettit, supra note 3, at 445-48.
7. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 3, at 79 ("We will not in a suit for reimbursement
for losses incurred in reliance on a contract knowingly put the plaintiff in a better
position than he would have occupied had the contract been fully performed.").
8.

DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS

55 (2d ed. 1994) ("The conventional wisdom is that expectancy damages are recoverable
only in contract, not in tort.").
9. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRAT 88 (1974). As David
Slawson pointed out, Gilmore did not address remedies expressly, but by implication
seems to support reliance recoveries. W. David Slawson, The Role of Reliance in
ContractDamages, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 197, 207 (1990).
10. There are some hints of this in Laycock's casebook. See LAYCOCK, supra note
8, at 55-56 (noting that distinctions between remedies for tort and contract "are
unobjectionable as a matter of formal logic" but asking whether "they make any sense as
a matter of policy?"). Naturally, questions in a casebook may be designed to challenge
student thought rather than to express the author's conclusions.
11. One unpublished discussion provides further support. While working on my
earlier article, I had the good fortune to share an afternoon with Professor Patrick Atiyah,
who was visiting the University of San Diego at the time. Professor Atiyah's excellent
work took a more favorable view of the reliance interest as an appropriate remedy in
contract cases.

See P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 4

(1979). In support of this position, he argued that contract was just like tort: "Somebody
dug a hole; someone else fell in." Thus, the remedy should be the same as for a tort: the
reliance interest. Interview with Patrick S. Atiyah in San Diego, Cal. (Feb. 1991).
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does not limit recoveries to reliance even in this context. Second, focus
will shift to personal injury actions. In these cases, it makes very little
difference whether we call the remedy reliance or expectation; the same
results will apply in almost every case. In cases where it might make a
difference, however, there is no support for the suggestion that tort law
prefers reliance to expectation. Finally, the Article will assess the
implications of this discussion. Fundamentally, it concludes that the
reliance interest does not respond to concerns about remedies at all. Its
primary rationale centers on liability. That conclusion may seem
familiar. I offered it as a possible explanation in my earlier work. "
Exploring the analogy to tort remedies reinforces the view that the
reliance interest is simply an effort to preclude enforcement of promises
where reliance did not exist, even when they are part of a bargain.
II. THE RELIANCE INTEREST IN MISREPRESENTATION

Courts confront the difference between expectation and reliance in
addressing the tort of misrepresentation. Two rules have emerged for
calculating damages for this tort. The benefit-of-the-bargain rule allows
the plaintiff to recover as if the misrepresentation were true, not false.
Thus, someone who purchases land in reliance on a misrepresentation
that the land contains gold deposits would recover the value the land
would have had if gold deposits actually existed on the land."3 The outof-pocket rule allows the recovery of the difference between what the
plaintiff gave up as a result of the fraud and what she received as a result
of the fraud." Thus, our plaintiff promised a land of gold could recover
the difference between the price paid and the actual value of the land
(without the gold deposits). 5
The benefit-of-the-bargain rule bears a clear resemblance to the
expectation interest. In fact, the rule comes close to transmuting the case
from tort into contract. Instead of making the defendant pay damages
that have the effect of rescission, the rule in effect treats the
misrepresentation as a warranty and enforces the warranty with the usual
contract measure: the difference between the value the goods would
12.

Kelly, supranote 1, at 1781.

13.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS

§ 549(2) illus. 4 (1977).

14. Id. § 549(1)(a).
15. If the plaintiff also incurred expenses before discovering the fraud-say, the
cost of excavations-those expenses would be included in the out-of-pocket recovery.

Id. § 549(1)(b).

have had if they had been as warranted and their actual value in the
condition in which they were received.'6
The out-of-pocket rule, on the other hand, resembles the reliance
interest in limiting recovery to actual expenditures, and perhaps
including lost opportunities.
Like the reliance interest, it looks
backward to the position the plaintiff occupied before the wrong, rather
than forward to the position she hoped (or expected) to occupy after the
successful completion of the transaction. Before the wrong, the plaintiff
had money. After spending the money, she had, in our example, land
worth a certain amount. The difference between those two values will
restore her to the position she occupied before the wrong. 7 The analysis
works as well when the plaintiff is induced to sell property based on
misrepresentation of its value. Before the wrong, she had property
worth a certain amount. After the wrong, she had money worth less than
that. The difference will restore her to her rightful position. In cases
where that would not be true, plaintiff would not seek damages, but
would instead demand rescission and specific restitution of the property.
The out-of-pocket rule has much to recommend it. The rule appears to
comport with the normal rule of remedies: to put the plaintiff in the
position she would have occupied if the wrong had not occurred.'8 By
hypothesis, the deceived person (plaintiff) would not have entered the
transaction if she had been told the truth. 9 If she had not entered the
transaction, then she would not have incurred any expenses associated
with the transaction. Instead, she would still have her initial money or
property.
The reliance interest might require remedies to go one step further,
including damages for opportunities forgone in reliance on the
misrepresentation. For example, if a party holds herself out as an
insurance agent and sells a policy, the buyer's out-of-pocket loss might
16. U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (1989). The rule can be translated to other settings, such as
the condition of land or the qualifications of an employee, without deviating from the
results dictated by the expectation interest.
17. The damages plus the proceeds from the resale of the land will equal plaintiff's
total expenditures. Of course, plaintiff could keep the land if she valued it more highly
than the market, thus ending up slightly better off than she was before, even if not as
much better off as she would have been had she found gold on the land.
18. United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958); LAYCOCK,
supra note 8, at 15-16 (coining the "rightful position" as a convenient shorthand for the
"position plaintiff would have been in but for the wrong").
19. This may slightly overstate the rule. A plaintiff may establish the tort of
misrepresentation without proving that she would not have entered the transaction but for
the misrepresentation. As long as the misrepresentation was a substantial factor in her
decision to enter the transaction, reliance is satisfied. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, §
546 cmt. b. Nonetheless, the remedy assumes that if properly informed, the deceived
person might have rejected the transaction or at least negotiated better terms for the
transaction. Thus, rescission is generally an appropriate remedy.
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be limited to premiums. The greatest harm of that misrepresentation,
however, lies in depriving the buyer of the opportunity to deal with a
real insurer. If the defendant had told the truth, the buyer probably
would have obtained insurance from another source. If, as seems likely,
the buyer discovers the fraud only after submitting a claim for a covered
loss, her damages would need to include any amount she could have
recovered from another insurer if not misled.
The illustrations to the Restatement (Second) of Torts suggest that lost
opportunities are recoverable under the out-of-pocket rule. Two
illustrations involve situations where the use of the product sold (a bull
in illustration 1, ball bearings in illustration 2) reduced the value of
another product (calves and cars, respectively).:
The Restatement
supports recovery of the "loss sustained by the inferiority of the
calves." 21 Similarly, "depreciation in the sales value of its cars because
of the inferior bearings" is allowed.? In each case, inferiority must be
measured against some other, better bull or ball bearings. Each
argument makes sense under section 549(l)(b) only as compensation for
the lost opportunity to obtain a better bull or better ball bearings
elsewhere, an opportunity lost because of the misrepresentation that this
bull or these bearings were of the required quality.
Lost opportunities move the out-of-pocket rule perilously close to the
expectation interest. Each illustration could easily be explained by
reference to the bull or ball bearings that conformed to the representation
(or warranty): having been promised a better bull, you may recover for
losses you would not have suffered if this bull had been as represented.
But that analysis would require us to move these illustrations under the
benefit-of-the-bargain rule. Rather, let us acknowledge-as Fuller and
Perdue did-that the recovery of lost opportunities often will make a3
reliance recovery approximately equal to an expectation recovery.
Some differences remain. In the insurance example, if the fraudulent
policy differed from the alternative policy plaintiff would have bought,
then a true reliance recovery would be measured by the terms of the
alternative policy. For example, if the deceiver sold a policy with no
deductible or co-insurance, but all other insurers with whom buyer could
have dealt imposed deductibles or co-insurance, recovery under the
20. d. § 549(1)(b) cmt. d, illus. 1-2.
21. Id. § 549ilus. 1.
22. Id. § 549 illus. 2.
23. Fuller & Perdue, supranote 3, at 62.

reliance interest would be limited to the amount recoverable under those
policies. Similarly, if the deceiver could demonstrate that, but for the
fraud, buyer would have purchased less insurance (perhaps because she
was unwilling to pay higher premiums and defendant's rates permitted
her to obtain more insurance than she possibly could have received from
another), recovery under the reliance interest would be limited to the
amount of insurance buyer would have purchased from the alternative
insurers. The illustrations to the Restatement (Second) of Torts do not
address this problem, so we have little indication whether it would
follow a true reliance interest in computing the out-of-pocket loss of a
fraud victim. Nonetheless, the resemblance between the out-of-pocket
rule and the reliance interest is sufficiently close to permit comparisons
between contract and the tort of misrepresentation.
The out-of-pocket rule makes logical sense for misrepresentation.
Remedies seek to put the plaintiff in the position she would have
occupied if the wrong had not occurred. The wrong was telling the lie.
If the lie had not been told, buyer (by hypothesis) would not have
entered the transaction. Damages, then, should restore the plaintiff to
the position she would have occupied if she had not entered the
transaction. The Supreme Court ruled the out-of-pocket measure was
the appropriate recovery under federal common law for the tort of
fraud. Courts have applied the out-of-pocket rule to actions arising
under the securities laws, at least for some violations.'
And the
Restatement (Second) of Torts identifies the out-of-pocket measure as an
appropriate remedy for misrepresentation, particularly when the
misrepresentation is negligent rather than fraudulent.26
Despite this logic, however, most state courts have opted for the
benefit-of-the-bargain rule as the appropriate measure of damages for
misrepresentation, at least when the misrepresentation is fraudulent, and
sometimes even when the misrepresentation is innocent. 7 Rather than
placing the plaintiff in the position she would have occupied if defendant
had not made the misrepresentation (that is, had she told the truth), they
place the plaintiff in the position she would have occupied if the
statement had been true?
There are several justifications for this decision. First, an out-of24.

Smith v. Bolles, 132 U.S. 125, 129 (1889).
25. Harris v. Am. Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 224-25 (8th Cir. 1975). But see Osofsky
v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 113-14 (2d Cir. 1981).
26. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 552B.
27. Id. § 549 cmt. g (criticizing, but acknowledging, this practice among most
courts); Robert B. Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: A Restitution
Alternative to Tort Damages,37 VAND. L. REV. 349, 358 n.26 (1984).
28.

RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 549(2) cmt. g.
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pocket measure may do little to deter some frauds. Particularly where
lost opportunity or expenditures, aside from amounts received by the
defendant, are likely to be minimal, the fraudfeasor faces a no-lose
situation. If the fraud is undiscovered, she can keep her ill-gotten gains.
If the fraud is discovered, however, plaintiff's recovery will be limited to
a refund of those gains. Aside from any costs of defending the action,
the fraudfeasor does not face a net position any worse that she occupied
before the fraud. To achieve an appropriate level of deterrence, courts
need to include some remedy over and above the out-of-pocket measure.
In some cases, punitive damages may provide sufficient incentive to be
honest. The benefit-of-the-bargain measure, however, provides a
deterrent in all cases, not merely those in which plaintiffs can establish
an entitlement to punitive damages.
Second, courts may resolve intuitions concerning relative
blameworthiness in favor of the benefit-of-the-bargain measure. On the
whole, fraud seems a more serious wrong than breach of contract. Yet
contract plaintiffs generally recover the expectation interest. To limit
victims of fraud, or even negligent misrepresentation, to a less generous
reliance-based recovery seems odd.2
Third, practical difficulties may impede efforts to limit fraud
recoveries to the out-of-pocket rule. Where the fraud leads to a contract,
the plaintiff can elect to sue on the contract. By alleging that the fraud
took the form of a promise or warranty, the plaintiff can secure an
expectation recovery for exactly the same words that, in tort, would
produce a reliance recovery. Courts could attempt to regulate this by
insisting that the finder of fact determine whether the statements made
by the defendant were in substance a promise or an assertion of fact.
Such an insistence seems unlikely to succeed, at least where the
statements are oral. It may be hard enough for jurors, faced with
conflicting testimony, to ascertain whether the statements were made at
all. To ask them to decide whether the words took the form of a promise
or of a statement of fact may demand more from the finders of fact than
is realistic. Rather than allow significant differences in the rule of
recovery to rest on such formal and perhaps unreliable judgments
concerning the nature of words spoken years before the trial, courts
generally have selected the benefit-of-the-bargain rule for fraud.
29. Of course, the incongruity could be resolved in favor of awarding the reliance
interest in contract cases. My views on that are expressed elsewhere and need not be
repeated here. See generallyKelly, supra note 1.

My point, however, does not depend on justifying the choice made by
the courts. The fact that courts, for the most part, have eschewed
reliance in favor of expectation suffices. In the tort where reliance
makes the most sense-where the out-of-pocket rule comports perfectly
with the ordinary remedial goals-courts nonetheless prefer an
expectation approach to produce appropriate remedies. Thus, the
remedies for the tort of misrepresentation offer very little support for
those who prefer reliance as a means to treat contract like tort. To treat
contract like misrepresentation, we would need to employ the
expectation interest, not the reliance interest. We must look elsewhere
to find a tort where reliance recoveries are in fact the rule.'0
The decision to pursue an expectation-like recovery in fraud does not
establish that a similar decision would be appropriate for any other tort.
Having conceded the theoretical justification for limiting recovery to
reliance in fraud, perhaps that theory supports the reliance interest in
other torts.
In fact, however, the theory itself is limited to
misrepresentation or, more appropriately, torts involving false
communication. We will search in vain for other torts where the nature
of the wrong justifies the reliance-based recovery.
III. RELIANCE IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES
Personal injury actions pose a difficult context in which to discuss the
reliance interest.
Conventional distinctions between reliance and
expectation make it difficult to imagine injury cases in which reliance
and expectation differ. Let's consider a simple case. A pedestrian
crossing the street is hit by a motorist who negligently failed to stop at a
stop sign. We can easily apply the general rule of damages. But for the
wrong, the plaintiff would not have been hit by the car. All injuries
resulting from the driver's failure to stop are recoverable.
Does it make any sense to ask whether the pedestrian's damages are
based on her reliance interest or expectation interest? We might ask
whether the pedestrian started across the street in reliance upon the fact
30. There is an element of circularity here. At least two of the justifications could
be ameliorated by using the reliance interest in both tort and contract. Perhaps the poor
choice courts make in contract actions forces them to make an equally poor choice in
fraud actions. This does not comport with the tone of court decisions. Despite the
invitation of the Restatement, one does not often encounter courts expressing regrets that
they must impose the benefit-of-the-bargain rule in fraud cases because of the poor
decision to use the expectation measure in contracts. It is at least equally plausible that
each case is handled appropriately. At the very least, there is very little authority in the
fraud cases for imposing reliance in contract cases. One can distinguish contract and
suggest it should be treated differently (since the wrong is lesser, justifying lesser
recoveries). But one cannot use tort law's nonendorsement of reliance as the basis for
arguing that contract law should follow suit.

The Phantom Reliance Interest
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that the driver would stop or with the expectation that the driver would
stop. But that locution does not seem to pose any difference, any choice
between competing ideals: spelling, not meaning, seems the only
distinction. Her injuries and her remedy are identical under either
characterization.
The prior paragraph, however, does not really capture the difference
between expectation and reliance as applied to damages. In contract
cases, we do not ask whether the plaintiff suffered harm because she
relied on performance or because she expected performance. Rather, we
contrast the position she would have occupied if performance had
occurred with the position she would have occupied if no promise had
been made in the first place. We need to find an analogous formulation
for tort.
Perhaps, as with misrepresentation, we can identify an approach that
looks forward and contrast it with one that looks backward, to mirror
one difference between expectation and reliance. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts certainly holds out that possibility:
While the law of contracts gives to a party to a contract as damages for its
breach an amount equal to the benefit he would have received had the contract
been performed, the law of torts attempts primarily to put an injured person in a
position as nearly as possible equivalent to his position prior to the tort.) 1

This language explicitly describes tort remedies as backward-looking,
seeking the position prior to the tort, in contradistinction to expectation
remedies. But it does not exactly tell us how a forward-looking remedy
for tort would differ from one that looks backward.
The obvious possibility does not seem very helpful. Reliance in tort
might focus on the position the plaintiff occupied immediately before
being hit by a car, while expectation might focus on the position she
would have occupied if she had not been hit by the car. The former
looks backward, as invited by the Restatement, and might be taken for
reliance. The latter, by focusing forward on a position the plaintiff had
not yet achieved but might have achieved but for the accident, might be
taken as expectation.
This pair of choices produces the opposite result from what the
Restatement suggests. To the extent that these two positions differ at all,
tort law chooses the forward-looking recovery. If tort remedies really
looked backward to the position before the wrong, they might reject any
31.

RESTAMENT

(SECOND)

OFTORTS

§ 901 cmt. a (1979) (citation omitted).

claim for money the plaintiff did not have at the time of the injury, but
might have obtained in the future. But whatever is meant by the
Restatement's rejection of expectation, it does not encompass the
rejection of future earnings the injured plaintiff might have received?
Tort law readily awards expected future gains every time it allows
recovery of wages the plaintiff had not earned on the date of the breach."
Lost wages do not restore some earlier position the plaintiff had
occupied, but a future position the plaintiff would have come to occupy
if the wrong had not occurred.
The Restatement contains a possible response, an explanation of how
the plaintiff's position before the accident really did include all of the
earnings she would have received but for the accident.4 Recovery of
future earnings represents compensation for lost earning potential:
before the tort the plaintiff had earning capacity; after, she had less
earning capacity by virtue of the injury.35
This explanation contains several flaws, but they are not central to the
point. 6 At best, this view permits tort damages to be explained by either
the expectation interest or the reliance interest. If both reliance and
expectation can justify the recovery of future wages, the fact that tort
remedies include recovery for them does not support classifying the
remedy as either reliance or expectation. To determine whether tort
remedies are based on reliance or expectation, we will need to consider a
way in which the two approaches might differ.
Perhaps the most serious objection to the preceding analysis is that it
focuses on timing (backward or forward) rather than on the nature of
wrong. In contract, there is a timing component to reliance and
32. Id. § 910.
33. Even scholars who support the reliance interest in contract law recognize that
wages not yet earned are an expectation recovery for tort victims:
Even in tort law, damages for future earnings are awarded as a matter of
everyday practice in personal injury actions; and such damages do not merely
take account of what the plaintiff was earning when injured, but also what he
might reasonably have expected to earn in the future (inflation apart). It is
difficult to understand how the common idea has grown up that expectation
damages cannot be awarded in a tort action.
ATIYAH, supra note 11, at 762-63.
34. RESTATEMENT, supra note 31, § 906(b).
35. Id.
36. Earning capacity may describe wages in personal injury cases, but must stretch
to explain defamation or wrongful discharge cases. No physical disability deprived the
plaintiff of earning capacity; plaintiff lost wages, not the ability to earn them. Nor is it
clear why the Restatement would seek to recharacterize future wages as if they were lost
on the date of the breach rather than as they came due, when it would be simpler simply
to acknowledge that lost earnings are an expectation. Also, if lost earning capacity is a
reliance measure, might it look to the next best job the plaintiff could have occupied
rather than the actual job held-at least in cases of wrongful discharge-in order to
determine what the earning capacity really was worth?
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expectation. Reliance, by focusing on the position that would have
resulted if the promise had not been made, necessarily seeks to restore a
position that had existed (plus any changes that would have occurred
between the date of contract formation and the present, if the contract
had not been made). Expectation, by seeking to create a position that
would have existed if defendant had fully performed, necessarily seeks
to create a position that had not yet come into existence (plus any
changes that would have occurred between the date of performance and
the present, if the contract had been performed). But these timing
components are not the essence of expectation and reliance. Rather,
they are artifacts of the contract setting. Reliance and expectation
characterize the wrong in very different ways. To evaluate whether tort
is based on reliance or expectation, we need to examine the way
expectation and reliance characterize the wrong and examine which
characterization seems more apt in a tort setting.
Expectation characterizes the wrong as the failure to perform a
promise. Thus, the expectation remedy asks where the plaintiff would
have been if the promise, the duty, had been performed. Reliance
characterizes the wrong as the making of a promise." Thus, the reliance
remedy asks where the plaintiff would have been if the promise had
never been made, if the duty had never existed. This distinction, at last,
permits us to decide whether tort remedies are more like expectation or
more like reliance.
Tort law seeks the position the plaintiff would have occupied if the
wrong had not occurred. Returning to our stop sign case, tort law would
ask where the plaintiff would be if the defendant had not hit the plaintiff:
that is, the position if the defendant had performed her duty by stopping

at the stop sign.
That approach resembles the expectation interest, not the reliance
interest. It posits the position if the duty had been performed, whereas
the reliance interest would seek the position the plaintiff would have
occupied if the defendant had no duty to stop at the stop sign."s
37. See, e.g., Slawson, supra note 9, at 208 (recognizing that reliance recoveries
imply the wrong is the making of the promise, and criticizing this implication).
38. Perhaps we could abbreviate that to the position the plaintiff would have
occupied if the defendant had no duty to stop. Those two versions differ slightly. The
text assumes a different state of the law: that drivers have no duty to stop at stop signs.
The second opens the possibility of a different state of facts: the position the plaintiff
would have occupied if the stop sign had not been there. Either approach might be apt in
a particular case, though the second seems to offer a more plausible scenario for the

The oddness of asking where plaintiff would be if defendant had no
duty to stop should be striking. The question ceases to bear any relation
to our normal rule of recovery: to put the plaintiff in the position she
would have occupied if the wrong had not occurred. Or, to the extent it
continues to bear any relationship to our normal inquiry, it does so by
redefining the conduct that seems wrongful-running the stop sign and
hitting the pedestrian-as rightful. In this, it is precisely analogous to
the reliance interest, which asks where the plaintiff would be if the
defendant never assumed a duty to perform a contract by not making the
promise in the first place. That question redefines the conduct we deem
wrongful, the breach of promise, as rightful, by removing,
counterfactually, any duty to perform the promise.
Courts could make the inquiry suggested by the reliance interest.
They could discern the plaintiff's position if the stop sign had not been
there. To do so we may need to choose among several possibilities.9
For instance, if no stop sign had been present, the plaintiff might have
remained on the curb instead of trying to cross while the car was
approaching. Alternatively, the plaintiff might have stepped out in front
of the car anyway in the hope that it would stop or out of neglect for the
car's presence. These two alternatives present the possibility that
reliance damages might differ from expectation damages.
Neither possibility, however, tells us much about the fundamental
remedial choice tort law makes. The first poses virtually no difference
from the expectation interest. The car will not hit the pedestrian, and her
position, but for the wrong, is that of an uninjured person, regardless of
whether the car stops or she remains on the curb as it zooms past her.4'
absence of a duty.
39. The same range of possibilities can exist in contract cases. When we ask the
position the plaintiff would have occupied if no promise been made, we face, at a
minimum, a choice between a plaintiff who would have entered a similar contract with a
different provider and a plaintiff who would have made no contract at all if she had not
made a contract with the specific defendant.
40. The same two possibilities exist if a stop sign is present but the law was such
that drivers had no obligation to stop at stop signs.
41. A plaintiff who remained on the curb might reach the other side of the street
somewhat later than a plaintiff who was crossing the street in front of a car who obeyed a
duty to stop at a stop sign. If crossing the street somewhat sooner would have produced
advantages for the plaintiff, the plaintiff could recover those advantages under the
expectation interest but not under the reliance interest. One might guess that tort law
would protect the gains a plaintiff would have received had she crossed the street
uninjured by the car. To the extent those gains were prevented by the defendant hitting
her, it appears the driver's failure to stop would be a proximate cause of those losses. To
the extent they could be proven to the requisite degree of certainty, plaintiff would be
entitled to recover them. Courts could deny recovery of those gains, but are unlikely to
do so by recourse to the reliance interest. The reason to deny those gains-a sense that
plaintiff should have remained on the curb rather than crossing-is likely to produce a
ruling that the plaintiff was contributorily or comparatively negligent in deciding to cross
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The alternative-that the plaintiff would have stepped out in front of the
car even if no stop sign were present-suggests the plaintiff's reliance
interest was zero. She is in fact already in the position she would have
occupied if no stop sign had been present: injured by having been struck
by the car. This is, in effect, a case where plaintiff did not rely on the
sign. The most we can hope is that a plaintiff, aware of the absence of a
stop sign, would have hurried across the street and, thus, perhaps
suffered a less serious blow from the car.
Perhaps the most revealing aspect of identifying these questions is
their novelty. They are novel because courts do not ask them. Courts do
not hypothesize ways in which the defendant might not have had a duty
to avoid injuring the plaintiff and then hypothesize what the plaintiff
might have done under those circumstances in order to ascertain how
much worse off she is today than she would have been under that highly
conjectural state of affairs. Instead courts are perfectly content to ask
where the plaintiff would have been if the duty had been performed.
They can compare a very real set of injuries with a plaintiff uninjured
because the tortfeasor did not breach a duty. They may encounter some
problems of causation, where claims that the plaintiff would have been
injured even if the defendant had performed need to be resolved.,- But
the driver's argument that the plaintiff might have walked in front of the
car even if there had not been a stop sign present simply plays no role in
damage calculations. The inquiry is entirely focused on the expectation
interest.
One might imagine that context matters. Perhaps my argument works
for traffic accidents but might not work for other personal injuries. This
seems unlikely if my premise is correct: that the reliance interest seeks to
restore the plaintiff to the position she would have occupied if the
defendant had no duty to perform. That question makes no sense in tort.
Tort duties, generally considered as obligations not to injure others, are
imposed by society on all persons, not voluntarily undertaken.' The
the street When she did. This may not prevent inclusion to the gains plaintiff would have
made had she crossed the street sooner, but will reduce the portion of the harm
recoverable or bar recovery altogether.
42. This is not the same as asking whether the plaintiff would have jumped in front
of the car even if the driver had no duty to stop. The claim here would have to be that

even if the driver had stopped, the plaintiff would have been injured-say, by another car
running the stop sign in the next lane or by a following car failing to stop. hitting the
defendant's car, and driving it into the plaintiff.
43. I leave aside arguments that our obligations to society or to the government

arise out of our voluntary presence within the society. While those arguments may

hypothetical possibility that a person had no duty to avoid injuring
others serves no apparent purpose. Thus, remedial principles-tort or
contract-need not advert to it. The counterfactual possibility that the
circumstances did not give rise to a duty seems similarly pointless. We
can ask what would have happened if no stop sign had been present. But
why should we? It was there, the duty was breached, and the breach
caused injury.
The preceding paragraph contains the seeds of an argument for the
reliance interest in contract, but the argument is quite different from the
one I set out to rebut. Contractual duties are not imposed by society, but
voluntarily undertaken by individuals. The government really does not
care whether any particular vendor and any particular vendee enter into a
mutual agreement. If General Motors suddenly decided to keep all the
cars it made rather than sell them to others, its folly would be immense,
but would violate no law. Its duty to sell cars exists as a result of
voluntary agreements (promises) to sell cars, not from any compulsion
by the government or others. Thus, unlike tort, the defendant could have
created a situation in which she had no duty to perform the contract.
Because that situation is imaginable, perhaps it could be used as a
standard for measuring recoveries.
Note first how the argument now shapes up. The expectation interest
has become the standard remedy in tort. Despite this, the expectation
interest might not be the appropriate remedy in contract. The reliance
interest, therefore, no longer serves to unify remedies across these two
fields. Rather, use of the reliance interest would differentiate contract
from tort. And now, the shoe is on the other foot. Again, we must ask
why? Why should contract law be treated differently?
Picking up the train of this argument, the same questions that made the
reliance interest seem inapt in tort apply with equal vigor to contract.
Yes, we can imagine a world in which society imposes no duty to
perform promises once made. But it serves no apparent purpose to ask
where the plaintiff would have been if the law did not enforce promises.
Society does impose a duty to perform promises. And very few people
would suggest the world would be a better place without such a rule."
justify governing even dissenters within society, those arguments inevitably include
explanations seeking to justify disregarding the empirical falsity of the claim that all
members of society consent to be governed in anything approximating the way contracts
involve voluntary assent.
44. We may disagree about the circumstances under which society should impose
that obligation, but few would suggest the abolition of all liability for breach of contract.
I realize the reliance interest limits, but does not abolish, liability for breach. But the
justification for the limit-resting, as suggested here, on the possibility that the duty to
perform could have been avoided-rests on a possibility we all acknowledge is
undesirable.
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Yes, we can imagine the counterfactual possibility that defendant had no
duty to deliver cars to plaintiff-say, because no promise was made or
because no consideration was given in exchange. But that seems no
more useful than imagining that no stop sign existed. If the defendant
made a binding promise, why should the law pretend the promise was
not really binding for purposes of calculating the remedy?
Rhetorical questions are a dangerous device. Someone always has an
answer, perhaps one not anticipated by the author." Nonetheless, I claim
a partial victory. The Article, to this point, has illustrated that the
expectation interest is no stranger to tort law, while the reliance interest
finds no home there. Thus, the suggestion that the reliance interest is
useful to make contract more like tort fails. That accomplishes the
purpose of this Article. As to the desirability of employing reliance in
contract even though it has no basis in tort, I leave
the issue to other
5
papers addressing that argument more thoroughly.
One other contextual difference between contract and tort merits
attention. The traffic accident case, like many torts, involves a case
where the breach makes the victim worse off than she was before the
breach. Contract, on the other hand, often involves duties to make a
party better off than she was before the breach. The reliance interest
would limit recovery to cases where the breach made the plaintiff worse
off than she was before the wrong. If that limitation is inherent in tort
remedies, then perhaps some means of building it into contract remedies
is needed to produce a uniform system of recoveries.
We can probe this by exploring torts where a defendant has an
obligation to make the plaintiff better off than she was before the breach.
In these cases, tort law could limit recovery to the reliance interest-the
position the plaintiff would have occupied if no duty had existed-or
could recognize expectation by giving the plaintiff the benefits she
would have received if the duty had been performed.
We might select several contexts to explore this proposition. One,
45. I imagine arguments about insufficient promising activity might arise. That
concern probably could be addressed by tinkering with contract excuses, rather than by

tinkering with contract remedies for unexcused nonperformance.

So soon after the

holidays, perhaps few people would argue that America really suffers from too little
commercial activity, despite the standard use of the expectation interest in contract law.
46. See, e.g., David W. Barnes, Remedies for Imperfect Transactionsin Contracts
and Torts, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 193 (2001); Robert L. Birmingham, Legal and Moral
Duty in Game Theory: Cormmwn Law Contractand Chinese Analogies, 18 BuFF.L. REv.
99, 103-10 (1968-1969); Kelly, supra note 1, at 1773-83.

misrepresentation, has already been discussed.47 Medical malpractice
cases offer several opportunities. In Hawkins v. McGee,48 for example, if
Dr. McGee had been guilty of negligence, would tort law really limit
recovery to the harm done to the hand? Or should the recovery allow
Hawkins the financial equivalent of any improvement that would have
been achieved if the surgery had been performed competently (though
not necessarily the benefit of the "perfect" hand warranted by Dr.
McGee)? My intuition favors the expectation recovery, but the case is
not so obvious. Legal malpractice cases might shed some similar light
on the question. Should recovery be the amount the plaintiff would have
recovered or saved if the attorney had performed competently
(expectation)? Or should the plaintiff only recover the costs she
incurred in pursuing the unproductive suit, thus putting her in the
position she was in before the representation?
To make the clearest case, let me choose a particular type of medical
malpractice: failure to diagnose. A patient seeks medical advice, the
physician negligently fails to detect a treatable medical condition, such
as a benign tumor, and the plaintiff suffers serious harm from the
condition, such as a stroke caused by the continued growth of the tumor.
Duty, negligence, and causation are built into the hypothetical. What
remedy should apply?
If the doctor had performed, the plaintiff would not have suffered the
stroke because the tumor would have been treated before it could cause
harm. The expectation interest would support recovery of all damages
resulting from the stroke.
If the doctor had no duty to discover the tumor-that is, if the patient
had never hired the doctor-then the plaintiff would have suffered the
stroke. The doctor did not cause the tumor, but simply failed to discover
it. Had no duty existed, the tumor still would have gone undetected, just
as it did in fact, and caused the precise harms the plaintiff now suffers.
The reliance interest would not support any recovery in these cases.
One could try to describe this as a reliance case by mischaracterizing
reliance as any change for the worse in the plaintiff's position. Before
the misdiagnosis, plaintiff had not suffered a stroke; afterwards, she had.
The plaintiff is worse off than before the consultation and, thus, has
suffered a reliance loss.
The stroke, however, was inherent in the plaintiffs condition on the
date of the misdiagnosis-just as future earning potential is inherent in
the plaintiffs condition on the date of the traffic accident. Absent any
intervention, the tumor will grow and cause a stroke. We do not have to
47.
48.

See supra Part II.
146 A. 641 (1929).
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guess; we know this because there was no intervention and the tumor did
grow and cause the stroke. One cannot claim that future earnings are
part of present earning potential without admitting that future harms are
part of present injurious conditions.
Focusing on harm to the plaintiff is pertinent in tort, but not to the
reliance interest. Tort law typically requires harm. Harmless negligence
(or harmless fraud) is not actionable. That the stroke left the plaintiff
worse off than she was before the consultation is sufficient, though
perhaps not essential, to establish injury. But it does not make that
injury a reliance injury.
The courts, of course, choose the expectation recovery. The doctor

may not have made the plaintiff worse off than she was before, but her
breach failed to make the plaintiff better off. The plaintiff is entitled to
the benefit of the duty.49 The case borders on misrepresentation. By
failing to reveal the tumor the doctor falsely represents, by assertion or

by silence, that the tumor does not exist-or perhaps that some other
condition caused the symptoms that lead the patient to seek medical

advice.

While not necessarily fraudulent, this misrepresentation is

material. If actionable, courts would need to choose between the benefit
of the bargain-where plaintiff would be if the doctor's statement had
been true, which presumably does not include a stroke caused by a
tumor-and the out-of-pocket measure-where plaintiff would be if the
doctor had told the truth, which presumably includes treatment for the
tumor.
Proponents of the reliance interest can justify this recovery by
49. See, e.g., Bueno v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 2d 627, 628 (W.D. Texas 1999)
(failure to diagnose heart disease caused fatal heart attack); Suttle v. Lake Forest Hosp..
733 N.E.2d 726, 728-29 (1l. 2000) ($11 million verdict reinstated where 3-hour delay in
diagnosis of low blood pressure in newborn precluded timely treatment); Galandauer v.
Brookdale Hosp. Med. Ctr., 710 N.Y.S.2d 396, 397 (App. Div. 2000) (failure to order
sonogram hastened death); Walker v. Zdanowitz, 696 N.Y.S.2d 509 (App. Div. 1999)
(delay in diagnosing peripheral vascular disorder caused amputation of plaintiff's legs).
In each of these cases, the patient's condition at time of trial was worse than it was at the
time of the misdiagnosis. But some courts do not require that, allowing recovery by
people who have recovered despite the late diagnosis, if the late diagnosis increased the
risk of relapse or decreased life expectancy. See, e.g., Alexander v. Scheid. 726 N.E.2d
272 (Ind. 2000) (failure to diagnose lung cancer justified recovery for decreased life
expectancy, even though cancer was in remission); Cahoon v. Cummings, 734 N.E.2d
535 (Ind. 2000) (death likely even if diagnosed, but 25-30% chance of survival if
diagnosis made timely); United States v. Anderson, 669 A.2d 73 (Dal. 1995) (treatment
cured the disease, but there was a chance-but not a probability---that the disease might
recur); Fetherolf v. Torosian, 759 A.2d 391 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (chance of surviving
breast cancer declined from 65% to 40% due to nine-month delay in diagnosis).

recourse to lost opportunities, just as they justify expectation in other
contract cases. Reliance on this doctor deprived the plaintiff of the
opportunity to consult a different doctor, who might have discovered the
tumor. By depriving the plaintiff of the opportunity to consult another
doctor, the doctor made the patient worse off than she was before the
duty arose." Similarly, the doctor did not really make her worse off than
she was before. The doctor simply failed to improve her condition. But
had the doctor refused to see her, some other doctor might have
improved her condition. Thus, if the duty had not existed, the plaintiff
might not have suffered the stroke.
The temptation to employ Occam's razor and claim the simpler
solution is strong. But a better argument exists.
If the reliance interest actually explains expectation recoveries in
failure to diagnose cases, one would expect to find cases where the
absence of alternatives produced zero recovery against negligent

doctors. That is, in a case where a plaintiff would not have sought
advice from a different physician if she was unable to see the defendant,
the defendant really did not preclude diagnosis by another doctor. Even
if the defendant had refused to see her,5" no other medical advice would
have been obtained. If reliance, rather than expectation, explains tort
recovery for failure to diagnose, that argument is a complete defense. 2
In situations where it could be demonstrated that the plaintiff would not
have sought medical advice from another physician,' the harm would
50. To be clear, the doctor did not really deprive the plaintiff of the opportunity to
seek another doctor's advice. She could always seek a second opinion. But the need for
a second opinion might not occur to her. Whether the doctor told her she was fine or
found and treated some other explanation for her complaints (thus missing the tumor but
reassuring the plaintiff that she was receiving medical care), the plaintiff reasonably
might rely on the doctor's professional competence. But if the doctor refused to see her
(thus not giving rise to a duty), the patient might have sought advice from another.
51. The doctor's refusal to see her is the most plausible way to pose the absence of
a duty. The doctor's refusal to enter a contract would prevent a duty. The plaintiff's
failure to seek care, while it would prevent a duty, is completely counterfactual (given
that the plaintiff did seek advice from a doctor) and would eliminate causation (since the
failure to obtain a diagnosis would be attributable to plaintiff's failure to seek one, not
defendant's failure to perform carefully).
52. The same argument can be raised in breach of contract actions, where a
plaintiff was not really deprived of an opportunity to obtain performance by bargaining
with another provider. See Christopher T. Wonnell, Expectation, Reliance, and the Two
ContractualWrongs, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 53 (2001).
53. This refinement to the hypothetical may strike some as unlikely. But several
situations make it plausible. For instance, suppose only one doctor served a community.
It might be demonstrated-or at least argued-that the plaintiff would not have sought
health care from another physician even if unable to obtain care from defendant.
Similarly, a plaintiff required by her health plan to see a particular primary care
physician might not have chosen to see another physician at her own expense, even if the
primary care physician refused to see her-or, more plausibly, refused to see her until
some time well into the future, at which point treatment might be too late. Alternatively,
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have occurred even if no duty had existed, and recovery should be zero.
That result should be counterintuitive. Moreover, no case support can

be found for the proposition. Perhaps no attorney has ever tried to argue
that the plaintiff deserves nothing because she would not have sought

advice from another doctor even if refused care by the defendant. That
lack of imagination surely must stem from the fact that no court has ever
suggested the argument had anything to do with the merits of the case.
Cases involving the failure to diagnose are simpler than the reliance
interest would make them. Patients are entitled to the benefit of careful

diagnostic services from their physicians. When a physician fails to
provide due care, she is liable for any harms plaintiff suffers that would
have been prevented had she discovered the condition earlier. The
breach of a duty deprives the patient of a benefit. That benefit will be
protected by tort remedies-in all cases, not just in cases where the

benefit would have been obtained from another if the defendant
(hypothetically) had refused undertake the duty involved. Even herewhere the duty produces improvements rather than restoring the plaintiff

to a condition already achieved on her own-tort law looks to
expectation for its measure of recovery. This context provides no basis
for claiming that tort is the home of reliance. '
Is there any tort case in which reliance rather than expectation seems

the better recovery? One hypothetical has been suggested that I find
troubling-not

because I cannot

conclude

that expectation

is

appropriate, but because I cannot find arguments that show reliance is
inappropriate.

Here is the hypothetical: a lone hiker in a wilderness comes upon
a plaintiff who intended to seek care from a different physician might delay finding
another suitable doctor (not always an easy task) if her regular physician had not been
available. Thus, the hypothetical should not be dismissed as unrealistic.
54. I concede that some tort cases award scanty recoveries where plaintiff is
claiming the benefit of improvement. For instance, in wrongful birth cases, courts have
been reluctant to award compensation for the costs that would have been incurred raising
a healthy child, even though those costs were causally related to a doctor's negligent
failure to diagnose conditions that would have caused the parents to prevent the birth.
These cases, however, cannot be explained by reliance. The doctor really failed to
prevent a loss, not cause a gain. Expenses for raising a child were losses not yet
incurred, not benefits sought from the services. Moreover, if reliance includes lost
opportunities to seek another diagnosis-as it must to explain any cases of failure to
diagnose--the doctor's failure to diagnose a pregnancy or a genetic defect while the
birth can still be prevented seems just as likely to prevent plaintiffs from seeking advice
from another. Stingy remedies are related more to issues of public policy and the
benefits rule than to the reliance interest.

another hiker in distress, say, choking on a piece of dried apple. No one
else is within miles of these two. The first hiker is well trained and
experienced in the Heimlich maneuver which, properly performed, will
save the other hiker's life. She attempts the Heimlich maneuver-thus
assuming a duty to do it carefully." But our rescuer performs the
maneuver carelessly, thus failing to save the life of the victim. 6 For
what damages is the defendant liable?
The reliance interest presumably would award no damages. In this
case, the defendant has not caused any harm, in that the victim is no
worse off than she would have been if the defendant had not undertaken
the rescue (and thus no duty had arisen). She would have died in either
event. The botched rescue demonstrably did not prevent anyone else
from undertaking a successful rescue, so lost opportunities also drop out
of the equation. Reliance produces no recovery.
Expectation allows recovery for the death. A careful rescue would
have saved the life. The failure to use due care caused the death. All
damages resulting from the death are recoverable.
Expectation seems perfectly plausible to me. But I have little to say to
someone whose intuition runs the other way. I feel somewhat sorry for
the Samaritan who could have left the victim on the path to die-and
who, if she had, would suffer no legal consequences-but who now
faces enormous damages because she did the right, moral, thing by
trying to help. But I do find it plausible to fault her for not taking due
care when trying to help. And the damages that resulted, though large,
are clear.
My best attempt to offer a justification for expectation is to change the
hypothetical slightly. Suppose that, instead of simply failing, the rescuer
had caused the death in a different way-say, by breaking a rib that
punctured a lung or the heart. Would the intuition of those who favor
the reliance interest still run toward no recovery? For purposes of
reliance, the facts are nearly indistinguishable. The victim would have
died from no help or from botched help. 7 The negligence did not make
her worse off, but merely failed to make her better off. But where the
act really does cause a physical harm, the case against the rescuer is
stronger. Shooting a poisoned person is still murder. Perhaps
55. Presumably no duty to rescue existed prior to undertaking the rescue.
56. If a wrongful death action skews the damage issues too greatly, assume instead
that the rescuer subsequently performs the maneuver successfully, but not until after the
victim's brain had been deprived of oxygen for too long, thus producing a living but
seriously incapacitated plaintiff.
57. The diehard reliance supporter may suggest that the victim might have
managed to perform the Heimlich maneuver on herself if the rescuer had not punctured
her heart. But that simply compels me to posit a victim unfamiliar with the maneuver or
already deprived of oxygen for so long that she is unconscious when the rescuer appears,
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negligently puncturing the heart of a dying person is still an actionable
tort. And if recovery is appropriate, how could it be measured except by
expectation?
Again, I should beware rhetorical questions. Maybe the victim should
recover for the loss of a minute or two of life. Maybe the pain of the
wound is all that she can recover.
Still, I wonder if tort law is improved by reading into it the reliance
interest. Given the possibility of an appealing scenario, will those
scenarios justify zero recoveries (or reduced recoveries) for tort
plaintiffs in other settings where reliance might limit a tortfeasor's
liability for her negligence? I suspect that the absence of reliance in tort
remedies is a good thing-that tort law would be worse off if we started
reading reliance justifications into recoveries that are fundamentally
based on expectation.
But at this point I have digressed. My goal is not prescriptive, but
descriptive. As currently formulated, tort recoveries are not based on
reliance. One would have to create new exceptions, not rely on existing
principles, to impose reliance limitations on tort recoveries. Thus, the
effort to limit contract damages to reliance cannot be justified as a means
of making contract more like tort. Rather, to make contract like tort,
contract must continue to employ the expectation interest. The plaintiff
is entitled to be placed in the position she would have occupied if the
duty, whether contract or tort, had been performed, not the position she
would have occupied if the duty had not come into existence.
IV. WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?

The intellectual exercise has been fun. But does it mean anything?
Does realizing that tort law really pursues an expectation interest put us
in a better position to handle any issue that might arise in, say, a court of
law?
Well, perhaps. If the argument is convincing, the Restatement may be
able to give up its rather dangerous defensive posture about how tort
remedies really are backward-looking, restoring states of affairs that
existed before. That posture can produce some drawbacks. But
improvements in tort remedies really were not my objective-nor is my
research in that field nearly sufficient to start prescribing improvements
at the level of detail this particular issue would require.
In contract remedies, I think I can offer two modest insights. Both
relate to the role reliance should play in contract law-not exactly court

issues, but perhaps of interest to more than a few of us here. The
exercise has crystallized an impression I formed earlier: that reliance
really is about when not to enforce promises, not about the remedy to
use when enforcing promises." At the same time, one argument in the
Article suggests that reliance might play a remedial role, but only
outside the realm of binding contracts."
The second observation is easier to explain than the first, so let me get
it out of the way first. In discussing both tort and contract, I argued that
it served no purpose to explore the position the plaintiff would have
occupied if, contrary to the facts, no duty to perform existed. But that
leaves open the possibility that reliance might indeed have a role to play
when a binding duty does not in fact exist. My temptation over the last
few years has been to see expectation and restitution as the only two
legitimate remedial interests, with not even an in-between role for
reliance. But I am more and more aware that, in those situations where
no duty to perform exists, reliance may play a role. To some extent, this
is the point of Professor Wonnell's article.'
He urges that, in
circumstances where the promise never should have been made in the
first place, perhaps we should allow the defendant to buy her way out of
the contract by paying reliance.
I reserve judgment on the extent to which an option to buy out the
contract at the reliance price should be made available outside the usual
contract defenses. Professor Wonnell is appropriately wary of making
the option available too broadly, thus undermining normal contract
damages, the expectation interest, when they will produce efficient
results. I am not sure that regret, even objectively justified regret,
should be sufficient to excuse the duty to perform a promise.
I also reserve judgment on whether every defect in binding promises
merits this treatment. Reliance remedies for promises unenforceable
under the statute of frauds virtually eliminate the statute, making it
harder for people who thought they had protected themselves against an
unwanted contract, by keeping their discussions unwritten, to obtain the
legal protection the legislature sought to provide.
But at least where the law would be inclined to grant an excuse
anyway, say for mutual mistake, misrepresentation, or undue influence,
conditioning the excuse on payment of the other party's reliance interest
would be apt. The nonbinding nature of the promise ceases to be
counterfactual in this setting. My rhetorical questions have no force
here. Thus, I wonder if this portion of Fuller and Perdue's work
58.
59.
60.

See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1777-82.
See supra note 44 & accompanying text.
Wonnell, supra note 52.
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deserves more attention than I have given it to date. I remain wary of
extending defenses beyond their current scope, but can see some
potential in reliance recoveries when contract performance has been
excused.
The other observation is more intricate, but it has a simple root. I
wonder if efforts to impose the reliance interest in contract remedies
stem not from a desire to make contract remedies more like tort
remedies, but to make contract liability more like tort liability.
Specifically, I wonder if proponents of the reliance interest primarily
want to introduce to contract law a requirement of harm or injury.
The requirement of harm or injury is common in tort. Negligence
liability does not exist unless the defendant's negligence actually injures
someone. Running the stop sign, even if negligent, produces no tort if
the pedestrian does remain safely on the curb.
Similarly,
misrepresentation is not actionable unless the plaintiff suffers a
detriment of some sort, though not necessarily out-of-pocket loss. The
fact of damage requirement under the antitrust laws is another example
of requiring evidence of some injury before allowing the case to
proceed.
No similar requirement exists in contract law. The availability of
nominal damages permits recovery by a plaintiff who benefited from the
breach.6' More importantly, the consideration doctrine, by permitting
enforcement of entirely executory promises, makes it possible for
plaintiffs to sue even when breach occurs before they suffered any
detriment in reliance on the contract. The more I explore the arguments
mustered for the reliance interest, the more I think they are aiming at
these targets, not at the expectation interest.
Consider: The most ardent proponents of the reliance interest focus
heavily on cases where the plaintiff arguably suffered no loss when the
contract was broken. 6, One wonders whether the real point of these
examples is to support a different measure of damages-which would be
zero, if the reliance interest governed contract remedies-or to illustrate
that liability makes no sense in this setting. The effect is the same for
parties to a true case of no reliance. But the effect of imposing the
61. Few plaintiffs sue just for nominal damages. Litigation costs exceed the
nominal award before the client intake interview is over. Awards of nominal damages
generally result from a serious miscalculation by the plaintiff (or her attorney)
concerning the extent of recovery available.
62. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principleand Its Limits, 95

HARV. L. REv. 741,794-97 (1982); Pettit, supra note 3. at 466-68.

reliance interest on the whole range of other contracts is remarkably
different from carving out an exception that denies enforcement of
promises when breach precedes reliance.
This motive also explains the lure of tort. From tort law comes the
requirement of injury as a prerequisite to liability. Perhaps tort's
apparent use of the reliance measure is not its real attraction.
On this view, consideration is the enemy. But, like the Maginot Line,
it defies direct attack. To achieve the objective, it must be flanked. The
expectation interest, like Belgium, lies in the path of the flanking
maneuver. Its destruction is not the goal, but a side effect.
The objective cannot be reached without conquering Belgium.
Contract remedial rules will not reject claims by a party who suffered no
reliance unless both injury is required and the reliance interest becomes
the measure of damages. Nominal damages would allow the plaintiff
who suffered no loss to maintain her suit despite the lack of reliance.
But more important, if the expectation interest defines when an injury
occurs, the nonperformance may produce a lost gain (an injury under
expectation) even if no reliance had been incurred.
Thus, recognizing the goal may not change the discussion. The attack
on the expectation interest will continue even if the reason for the attack
is limited to a requirement of harm. The quest to import the harm
requirement may draw support from tort. The reliance interest, however,
is not found in tort law. The expectation interest is the basic remedy
applied by courts in both contexts. Thus, whatever else may be said for
reliance, appeals to unifying remedies under a single principle should
have no appeal-or, rather, should support the use of expectation
remedies in both contract and tort.

